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THE IMPACT OF THE EURO ON LONG-TERM GROWTH IN PORTUGAL*
Alfredo Marvão Pereira**
This paper investigates the effects of the participation of Portugal in the Euro area. The
most important channel through which joining the Euro affects the economy is a reduction
in long-term interest rates. This reduction is expected to affect positively the domestic
growth fundamentals and, therefore, to improve long-term GDP “per capita”. Simulation
results suggest that long-term GDP “per capita” will improve by between 2.9 per cent
and 13.6 per cent, with the most likely scenario placing gains at 10.0 per cent. This cor-
responds to an increase of 0.4 p.p. in the annual average rate of growth of GDP, that is a
shift from a long-term trend of 3.1 per cent to a 3.5 per cent one.
1. INTRODUCTION
The participation of Portugal in the Euro area is
expected to affect the Portuguese economy
through several channels. However, one may ar-
gue that the leading channel through which mone-
tary unification renders an impact on the Portu-
guese economy is the reduction in the interest
rates that domestic agents will face in the future
(see, for example, Barbosa et all [1998]).
Interest rate reductions result from two differ-
ent mechanisms. First, the strict application of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rules
should reduce public indebtedness in the Euro
area substantially. An interest rate reduction
through this mechanism would benefit the Portu-
guese economy regardless of the Portuguese par-
ticipation in the Euro. Second, one can expect an
interest rate reduction due to the effects of in-
creased credibility of the domestic politics of mac-
roeconomic stability. This increase in credibility is
associated with the fact that, due to the participa-
tion in the Euro area, national authorities abdicate
from the exchange rate devaluation option. This
corresponds to the elimination of the associated
risk premium incorporated in the interest rate.
Access to financing at a lower interest rate is
expected to affect the economy in different ways.
First and foremost, private investment will in-
crease with the reduction in the interest rate. In
addition, this reduction will allow the public sec-
tor to increase public and human capital invest-
ment. With greater investment in private capital,
public capital, and human capital, the fundamen-
tal determinants of long-run growth of the Portu-
guese economy shall be strengthened.
At the same time, the Portuguese participation
in the Euro area places clear restrictions on the
ability of the domestic authorities to manipulate
the public budget. It is true that under the Euro
regime the national authorities continue to be re-
sponsible for the budget. Domestic budgetary pol-
icy, however, is greatly constrained by discipline
rules and procedural supervision and evaluation
at the EU level as well as by domestic commit-
ments under the Stability and Growth Pact.
Therefore, national authorities are obligated to fol-
low very stringent budgetary rules, with all the
added pressures that this entails.
The reduction in interest rates generated by the
participation in the Euro area affects the budget-
ary process in a positive manner. First, lower inter-
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** The College of William and Mary, Virginia, USA.est rates allow the public sector to refinance its
debt and thereby benefit from lower interest pay-
ments on its outstanding debt. Second, by increas-
ing GDP, lower interest rates enlarge the tax base
and, for given tax rates, increase tax revenues. The
relevant empirical question is to ascertain to what
extent the reduction in interest rates will generate
positive effects that are sufficient to neutralize the
budgetary pressures induced by the conditions of
the Stability and Growth Pact.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the ef-
fects of the reduction in interest rates associated
with the Portuguese participation in the Euro area
on the long-term performance of the Portuguese
economy as well as the budgetary strategies avail-
able to the domestic authorities. The analysis is
carried out in the context of an endogenous
growth model of the Portuguese economy, which
highlights the domestic growth fundamentals. The
endogenous growth model in this paper builds
upon the work of Barro [1990], Barro and
Sala-i-Martin [1992], King and Rebelo [1991],
Rebelo [1991], Romer [1986], and more specifically
the recent work by Gaspar and Pereira [1995] and
Pereira [1998].
The endogenous growth model presented in
this paper accommodates the evolution of private,
public capital and human capital, as well as do-
mestic public borrowing and the foreign account.
The endogenous growth approach is particularly
appropriate since the participation in the Euro
area is expected to enhance the accumulation of
the factors of production that can affect the
long-term growth rates and, therefore, GDP per ca-
pita. In addition, by accommodating the modeling
of the twin deficits, the public and the current ac-
count deficits, the model allows the incorporation
of the constraints that participation in the Euro
area itself impose on the domestic budgetary pro-
cess.
2. AN EXOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
2.1 The model
The evolution of the economy is represented by
the paths of five variables: private capital, Kt, pub-
lic capital, PKt, human capital, HKt, foreign financ-
ing, Ft, and public debt, PDt.
The equations of motion for the different types
of capital are:
() () KI A C I K d K tt I t t K t + =- +- 1 1 , (1)
() ( ) PK Pi AC PI PK d PK t t PI t t PK t + =- + - 1 1 (2)
() ( ) HK HI AC HI HK d HK t t HI t t HK t + =- + - 1 1 , (3)
where dK, dPK, and dHK, are the rates of depreciati-
on of private, public, and human capital; It, Pit,
and HIt are investment in private, public, and hu-
man capital; and ACI(.), ACPI(.), and ACHI(.) are
the corresponding adjustment cost functions.
The adjustment of the different stocks of capital
toward their optimal levels is costly. This idea is
captured by investment-specific adjustment-cost
functions representing foregone capital accumula-
tion. The adjustment-cost functions are non-
negative, monotonically increasing, and strictly
convex in investment and capital. These functions
are assumed to be quadratic in investment per unit
of installed capital:
() ( ) AC I K u I K It t It t ,. / =05
2
(4)
() ( ) AC PI PK u PI PK PI t t PI t t ,. / =05
2
(5)
()( ) AC HI HK u HI HK HI t t HI t t =05
2
./ (6)
where uI, uPI, and uHI are the adjustment-cost pa-
rameters associated with private, public, and hu-
man capital accumulation, respectively.
The economy produces one tradable good, Yt,
using a well-behaved production technology. Pro-
duction utilizes private capital, labor, and public
capital. As in King and Rebelo [1991] and Rebelo
[1991], the labor input is reproducible and the
stock of human capital is embodied in workers.
The labor input can be adjusted by changing the
number of workers, Lt, or by changing human cap-
ital. The total number of workers is exogenous and
grows at a constant rate, n. In turn, public capital
represents a positive externality for the private
sector. Public capital does not generate explicit
compensation such that an intertemporal equilib-
rium can exist. Public capital is a pure public good
in the tradition of Diewert [1988], and Romer
[1986], who focuses on externalities related with
the average capital level of the economy.
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capital, displaying increasing returns when public
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where A0 is the output scaling factor, 0 < b < 1 is
the cost share of capital in total expenditure, and
0<v<1i st h epublic capital externality factor.
Domestic production and imports are absorbed
by domestic expenditure on consumption, Ct, the
different types of investment, and exports. Net
imports, Mt, are:
MCP CIP IH IY tt t t t t t =+ + + + - (8)
The equation of motion for foreign financing
represents the current account position:
() Fr F M R C F tt t t t t + =+ + - - 1 1 (9)
where Rt represents the unilateral private transfers
(emigrants’ remittances, for example) and CFt re-
presents unilateral public transfers (EU transfers,
for example). The domestic country is a small
open economy that can obtain the desired foreign
financing at a rate of return, rt, which is determi-
ned in the international financial markets.
It should be pointed out that in the context of
EMU, equation (9) loses much of its traditional
meaning as an intertemporal budget constraint.
This is certainly the case with respect to Portu-
guese transactions within the EMU borders. Fur-
thermore, one would expect Portuguese foreign
trade in the future to be even more increasingly
concentrated within the EMU area. Therefore, in
EMU equation (9) essentially plays the role of a
mere accounting device.
The equation of motion for public debt reflects
the fact that government expenditures have to be
financed by taxes and by changes in public indebt-
edness. Government expenditures include spend-
ing on consumption and investment activities, PCt,
PIt and HIt, as well as interest payments on public
debt at a rate rt. Given the progress in the last de-
cade in the areas of financial integration and finan-
cial desintermediation, it is natural to assume that
the relevant rate for public borrowing is the same
as the rate on international borrowing. In addi-
tion, the government receives unilateral public
transfers, CFt, and transfers funds to the private
sector, PTt. Finally, tax revenues are obtained by
applying a flat and exogenous tax rate, ty, to the
domestic output. The equation of motion for pub-
lic debt is:
() P D r P DP CP IH IP T C Ft Y tt t t t t t t y t + =+ + + + + - - 1 1 (10)
The optimal path for the domestic economy is ob-
tained from the maximization of a social welfare
function. This function is the present discounted
value, at the social rate r, of a well-behaved utility
function defined on private and public consumpti-
on per capita. As is Barro [1990] government finan-
ces services, such as health, which enter into hou-
sehold utility. The social discount rate may be in-
terpreted as the marginal rate of substitution bet-
ween present and future consumption, for a given
level of composite consumption. The utility functi-
on is CES with share parameter aC and elasticity
of substitution 1/(Sc-1 ) .
2.2 Budgetary projections in the context of the growth
model
National economic authorities have the discre-
tionary power to set the trajectories of the public
sector variables. Given these budgetary rules, the
optimal paths generated by the model reflect the
optimal decisions of the private agents, in terms of
both consumption and private investment activi-
ties.
The different components of the public budget
are assumed to evolve at fixed growth rates:
() PC g PC th p c
h
t + =+ 1 (11)
() PI g PI th p i
h
t + =+ 1 (12)
() HI g HI th h i
h
t + =+ 1 (13)
() PT g PT th p t
h
t + =+ 1 (14),
where gpt,g pi, ghi and gp represent the growth rates
of public consumption, public investment, human
capital investment, and public transfers, respecti-
vely. It is assumed that all of these components of
the public budget grow at the growth rate of the
GDP. This means that the composition of the pu-
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these components, as a percentage of GDP, rema-
in constant.
Finally, tax revenues are determined by the
evolution of GDP (the tax rates being held con-
stant) while interest payments on the public debt
depend on the evolution of interest rates.
3. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
3.1 Numerical implementation strategy
The characterization of the optimal solution to
the endogenous growth problem can be inter-
preted as a two-point boundary problem. Given
the complexity of the problem, no attempt is made
to develop an analytic solution. Instead, the model
is parameterized and solved numerically. Com-
parative dynamic analysis is approximated by
solving the model numerically for different config-
urations of the relevant exogenous variables.
The numerical implementation is based on a
strategy similar to that in Jones, Manueli, and
Rossi [1993], Pereira [1994], and Gaspar and
Pereira [1995]. To solve the infinite horizon prob-
lem numerically, truncated versions with finite
time horizons are considered. To minimize termi-
nal effects associated with truncation, terminal
constraints are introduced which are consistent
with post-terminal steady-state values. Simula-
tions were found to be very robust to truncation
for a time horizon of 60 years.
Given truncation, the optimization problem is
solved using nonlinear programming methods.
These techniques are very flexible in that they do
not depend on the formulation of the optimality
conditions but only on the general specification of
the problem. Furthermore, they have been widely
tested, have known error properties, and are very
robust for ill-conditioned problems. They also
guarantee, by the use of non-negativity constraints
on both state and shadow price variables, that the
solution generated is a bona fide saddle-point solu-
tion to the optimization problem under consider-
ation. A sequential programming method was
used where each iteration solves a linear approxi-
mation to the nonlinear problem. Each iteration
generates a search direction for the maximization
of an augmented-Lagrangian merit function. Final
convergence of the sequence of linear approxima-
tions is achieved according to preset default levels
of a modified quadratic penalty function. (See Gill,
Murray, and Wright [1981] and Murtagh and
Saunders [1982] for a discussion of these tech-
niques.)
3.2 The data, parameter specification and calibration
The data set used in the numerical implementa-
tion of the model is obtained mostly from the Sta-
tistical Annex of the European Economy No. 63
[1997] and is reported in Table 1. It reflects GDP
and stock variable values in 1996. The decomposi-
tion of the aggregate variables, however, follows
the average for the period 1986-1996. This ap-
proach for the decomposition of aggregate vari-
ables reflects the nature of the model. The model
captures the behavior of the economy around a
smooth trend but does not capture business cycle








Private unrequited transfers·················· 1.048
Current account balance ····················· -0.224
Public Sector Accounts
Tax revenues ······························ 5.636
Public consumption ························ 2.018
Public investment ·························· 0.592
Public human capital investment ············ 0.672
Public transfers ···························· 2.292
Interest public debt ························ 0.779
Public balance ····························· -0.817
National Accounts
G D P······································ 16.012
Private consumption ························ 9.783
Public consumption ························ 2.018
Private investment ························· 3.507
Public investment ·························· 0.592
Human capital investment ·················· 1.200
Stock variables
Private capital stock ························ 30.585
Public capital stock ························· 7.928
Human capital stock ························ 34.615
Labour force (asa%o fpopulation) ··········· 0.478
Active labour force (asa%o fpopulation)······ 0.449
Foreign debt ······························· 2.434
Public debt ································ 10.392
Source: Data documentation is available from the author upon re-
quest.fluctuations. As a corollary, temporary deviations
of the actual economy from its long-run trend will
not be captured in the simulations. Since the data
covers a complete business cycle, however, the
model implementation is not contaminated by
business cycle effects.
The period 1980-1996 was chosen to reflect the
most recent available information. In addition, one
can argue that the data regarding this period has
not been contaminated by the effects resulting
from expectations about the participation of Por-
tugal in the Euro area. Therefore, calibrating the
model for 1980-1996 allows the simulations to cap-
ture the changes generated by the Euro, since a
comparison is established between the optimal
paths that would result from continuing the trends
recorded in 1980-1996 and the new optimal trajec-
tories under the Euro conditions.
Parameter values are reported in Table 2. Pa-
rameters are obtained in different ways. Whenever
possible, parameter values are taken from the
available statistics or the literature. This is the case
for population growth rate, the share of private
consumption in total consumption spending, the
effective tax rate, the output scale parameter, the
share of labor and private capital in production,
and the interest rate. For the parameters for which
no empirical information is available, one of two
strategies was followed. In some cases reasonable
values were arbitrarily chosen. These were the
cases of the elasticity of substitution, the public
capital externality parameter, and the depreciation
rates.
The remaining parameter values — such as the
discount rate and the cost-of-adjustment function
parameters — were obtained by calibration. They
were chosen in such a way that the numerical
model exactly replicate the data for 1996 and ex-
actly extrapolate into the future the trajectories of
GDP growth rates, the composition of consump-
tion and investment spending, public deficits, and
current account position. These parameters are
central to the descriptive power of the simulation
results: the discount rate mostly affects foreign
debt while adjustment costs mostly affect the rela-
tive composition of the different types of invest-
ment. The choice of the discount rate is guided by
the fact that endogenous growth requires that the
discount rate should not exceed the after-tax inter-
est rate. The specification of the adjustment cost
parameters presumes that adjustment costs are 20
per cent of investment in the base year for all types
of investment.
The calibrated values for the endogenous vari-
ables in the model are presented in Table 3. This
base case scenario, which will be referred to as
Case 1 reflects the status quo, i.e., the optimal tra-
jectory for the Portuguese economy in the absence
of the structural changes under consideration.
The numerical implementation of the model
was extensively tested in terms of the sensitivity of
the benchmark trajectories with respect to differ-
ent parameter specifications. Naturally, different
parameter specifications lead to different levels,
say, of GDP growth and long-term GDP per capita.
For example, the greater the public capital
externality, the greater is the marginal productiv-
ity of both private and public capital, and hence
the greater is GDP growth. Despite the differences
in the optimal trajectories under different parame-
ter values, the size and pattern of changes induced
by the Euro are remarkably robust.





Discount rate ······························· 0.9650
Population growth rate······················ 0.0017
Share private consumption ··················· 0.7930
Elasticity of substitution ····················· 0.6500
Effective tax rate ···························· 0.3520
Production parameters
Output scaling factor ························ 0.2090
Private capital share ························· 0.3700
Public capital share·························· 0.1000
Capital depreciation ························· 0.0600
Public capital depreciation ··················· 0.0300
Human capital depreciation ·················· .0000
Private capital adjustment cost················ 2.1800
Public capital adjustment cost················· 3.3480
Human capital adjustment cost ··············· 7.2120
Other parameters
Interest rate ································ 0.075
Growth of foreign transfers··················· 0.031
Growth of public transfers···················· 0.031
Source: Data documentation is available from the author upon re-
quest.4. ON THE EFFECTS OF THE EURO ON THE
LONG-TERM GROWTH
4.1 Modelling the participation in the euro area
In terms of the numerical simulations, the eval-
uation of the impact on the Euro depends critically
on the changes in interest rate considered. This is
true both in terms of the status quo considered as
well as the magnitude of the interest rate reduc-
tion. Consider first the issue of the definition of
the relevant status quo. It could be argued that the
status quo used to calibrate the model, which con-
siders an interest rate of 7.5 per cent, would also
be a realistic description of the economy in the
case of Portugal not joining the Euro area. This is
because the Portuguese authorities have been con-
sistently engaged in policies that promote macro-
economic stability which, presumably, would con-
tinue in such event. In addition, some of the bene-
fits from the Euro, due to reduced public indebt-
edness in the Euro area, would accrue regardless
of the Portuguese participation.
The argument could also be made that the ef-
fects of the Portuguese participation in the Euro
area should be measured against a scenario with
an interest rate higher, albeit temporarily so, than
the one used to calibrate the model. In fact, in the
case of non-participation, the strong priors on the
Portuguese participation would be defrauded and
the possibility of exchange rate and financial crisis
could not be summarily dismissed. A speculative
attack against the Escudo would make exchange
rate stability increasingly costly. Substantial in-
crease in the interest rate could be necessary to
prevent a devaluation of the domestic currency.
To accommodate these considerations a scenario is
considered which contemplates an increase of one
percentage point in the interest rate
The question of the magnitude of the interest
rate reduction induced by the participation of Por-
tugal in the Euro area is a complex one. This re-
search used estimates presented by Barbosa et all
[1998]. The long-term interest rate reduction is es-
timated to be between one and three percentage
points vis-à-vis the observed long-term interest
rate. This corresponds to a reduction of between
two and four percentage points if non-par-
ticipation gave rise to a one percentage point
worsening of the observed interest rate levels. Of
this total a reduction of about half a percentage
point could be attributed to the reduction in public
indebtedness in the Euro area which would occur
as a results of the application of stringent budget-
ary rules and is, therefore, independent of the Por-
tuguese participation.
According to the discussion above, this paper
considers three scenarios in addition to the base
case scenario. One of these, Case 2, considers a
one percentage point increase in the interest rate,
reflecting a pessimistic outcome in the case of
non-participation. In the other extreme, Case 4,
considers a three percentage points interest rate
reduction. A comparison between both cases pro-
vides an upper limit to the Euro effects. In one of
the other cases, Case 3, a one percentage point re-
duction in the interest is considered. The differ-
ence between this case and the central scenario
provides the lower limit one can attribute to the
euro effects.
4.2 The long-run effects on the euro on GDP
Let us start by considering the effects of the
Euro on the GDP in the long term as measured by
comparing Case 1, the base case, and Case 4,
which reflects an interest rate decline of three per-
centage points over the base case. Under these
condition the Euro would induce a substantial in-
crease in private investment. Private investment
would increase by approximately six percentage
points of the GDP. As a results the GDP growth
rate would be increased over time by between 0.2
and 0.6 percentage points. Ultimately, the long-
term GDP per capita would be enhanced from 207.0
to 227.6, a 10.0 per cent increase, approximately.
This corresponds to an average yearly increase in






Private consumption / GDP ·········· 61.1
Public consumption / GDP············ 12.6
Private investment / GDP············· 21.9
Public investment / GDP·············· 3.7
Human capital investment / GDP······ 7.5
Public deficit / GDP·················· 65.0
Public deficit / GDP·················· 5.1
Current Account deficit / GDP ········ 1.4the GDP growth rate of approximately 0.4 percent-
age points, i.e., a change from 3.1 per cent to 3.5
per cent.
The same pattern of results is identified if we
consider the other Euro scenarios. In fact, the
lower bound for the effects, obtained by compar-
ing Case 1 and Case 3, is a 2.9 per cent gain in the
long-term GDP per capita. In turn, the upper
bound for the effects, obtained by comparing Case
2 and Case 4, is a 13.6 per cent gain in the
long-term GDP per capita.
Consider now the budgetary implications of a
reduction in the interest rate. By design, the pro-
jected public deficits in Case 1, the base case, are
around 5 per cent of the GDP. These projections,
one may recall, are based on the assumption that
all components of the budget grow at the same
rate as the GDP in the base case, i.e., at a yearly
rate of 3.1 per cent. Clearly, such deficits would
not be acceptable under the conditions of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. The relevant question,
however, is what the public deficits would be un-
der the new interest rate associated with the par-
ticipation in the Euro area
In Case 4, and under the same projection rules,
public deficits would decline progressively. The
public budget would reach a balanced budget situ-
ation around the year 2006. After this, the budget
would show increasingly larger surpluses. This
change of the budgetary situation under Case 4 is
the result of lower interest payments on the out-
standing public debt and greater tax revenues due
to an expanding tax base. In addition, the growth
of the different components of the budget, which
has been set at 3.1 per cent, is now relatively lower
than the GDP growth rates. These results suggest
that the positive effects of lower interest rates
greatly reduce the pressures placed on the domes-
tic authorities by the Stability and Growth Pact.
The fact that the public debt shows an auto-
matic tendency to decrease under the new interest
rate conditions is important in itself. This situa-
tion places a lower premium on running budget
surpluses as is projected in Case 4. It is, indeed,
relevant to inquire what additional gains in terms
of long-term GDP performance could be achieved
by marginally changing the design of the budget-
ary projection.
Let us consider a budgetary strategy that deter-
mines that the public budget has to be balanced
within a five-year period and should remain in
balance thereafter. This new budgetary strategy is
fully consistent with the rules of the Stability and
Growth Pact. At the same time, it allows for the
surpluses projected in Case 4 to be used in ways
that can enhance long-term growth. Three scenar-
ios were considered as regards the differences be-
tween the budget position under Case 4 and the
target deficits. In Case 5 differences are accommo-
dated by changes in tax revenues, in Case 6 by
changes in public investment, and in Case 7 by
changes in human capital investment.
To the extent that the reduction in interest rates
makes public funds available for other purposes,
investment activities can be expanded. In Case 5,
lower tax rates would lead to higher private in-
vestment and, therefore, higher GDP. In turn, in
cases 6 and 7, higher public investment and invest-
ment in human capital would directly lead to a
higher GDP, but also indirectly, through its effects
on the marginal productivity of private invest-
ment and on private investment itself.
As Table 4 reports, all three cases allow for in-
creases, though marginal, in the long-run position
of GDP per capita in the economy. The corre-
sponding upper bounds for the effect of the inter-
est rate reduction would be 13.8 per cent, 14.8 per
cent and 13.9 per cent in Cases 5, 6, and 7, respec-
tively, compared to 13.6 per cent under Case 4.
This increase in the long term GDP per capita is to
be understood as a direct consequence of the fact
that the reduction of interest rates reduces budget-
ary pressures. This reduction in budgetary pres-
sures acts to an extent such that not only the con-
ditions of the Stability and Growth Pact can be sat-
isfied but also that public spending can still be
further increased in ways that increase the
long-term GDP growth prospects.
4.3 How important are the long-term effects of the
euro?
We have already established that the effects of
the Portuguese participation in the Euro area are
substantial in absolute terms. We would like,
however, to have an idea of the relative impor-
tance of these effects. A good way of measuring
the relative importance of the effects of the partici-
pation in the Euro area is by comparing such ef-
fects to the effects of EU structural transfers. This
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at least partially, overlap in their effects on the
Portuguese economy. Indeed, both policies have
the potential to enhance the long-term growth po-
tential through the stimulation to investment ac-
tivity. The participation in the Euro area does that
mostly through market mechanisms while the EU
structural polices achieve that mostly through ad-
ministrative mechanisms.
For the purpose of the numerical simulation ex-
ercise, the design of the structural transfer pro-
grams follows the Community Support Frame-
work for Portugal for 1994-1999 (see Commission
of the European Communities [1994] for details).
The Community Support Framework details the
value of annual transfers, the composition of these
transfers (private and public physical capital, and
human capital), and the co-financing requirements
(EU transfers, private and public domestic match-
ing funds). Due to lack of more accurate data,
transfers under the new Community Support
Framework for 2000-2006 — under negotiation at
the date of the preparation of this article — follow
exactly the same pattern of the current transfer
programs.
Case 8 considers the effects of EU structural
transfers. Simulation results reported in Table 5
suggest that the GDP per capita in the long term is
enhance by 3.4 per cent by the structural programs
under consideration. This corresponds to an aver-
age yearly increase in the GDP growth rate of ap-
proximately 0.15 percentage points, i.e., a change
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Table 4
EFFECTS OF THE EURO
GDP per capita
(1996 = 100.0)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
1996 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2000 112.2 111.4 112.9 114.2
2005 130.0 127.9 132.0 135.8
2010 151.3 147.8 154.6 161.5
2015 176.7 171.7 181.5 191.9
2020 207.0 200.4 213.1 227.6
GDP per capita
(1996 = 100.0)
Case 1 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
1996 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2000 112.2 114.2 114.9 115.0
2005 130.0 135.9 138.5 139.3
2010 151.3 161.7 165.1 165.7
2015 176.7 192.1 194.0 192.3
2020 207.0 228.0 230.1 228.1
Remarks:
Case 1: base case.
Case 2: increase of 1 percentage point in the interest rate.
Case 3: reduction of 1 percentage point in the interest rate.
Case 4: reduction of 3.0 percentage points in the interest rate.
Case 5: Case 4, under a balanced budget target (tax replacement).
Case 6: Case 4, under a balanced budget target (public investment replacement).
Case 7: Case 4, under a balanced budget target (human capital investment replacement).
Table 5
ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
OF THE EFFECTS OF THE EURO
GDP per capita
(1996 = 100.0)
Case 1 Case 4 Case 8
1996 100.0 100.0 100.0
2000 112.2 114.2 114.5
2005 130 135.8 136.8
2010 151.3 161.5 159
2015 176.7 191.9 184.1
2020 207 227.6 214.1
Remarks:
Case 1: base case.
Case 4: reduction of 3.0 percentage points in the interest rate.
Case 4: reduction of 3.0 percentage points in the interest rate.
Case 8: structural transfers for the period 1996-2006.from 3.1 per cent to 3.25 per cent. Clearly, the po-
tential effects of structural transfers are very close
to the lower bound of the effects of the participa-
tion in the Euro area. This suggests that the effects
of the Portuguese participation in the Euro area
are very substantial also in relative terms.
5. SUMMARY
This paper investigates the effects of the partici-
pation of Portugal in the Euro area. The most im-
portant channel through which joining the Euro af-
fects the Portuguese economy is a reduction in
long-term interest rates. This reduction is expected
to affect positively the fundamentals of economic
growth in Portugal and, therefore, to improve long-
term GDP per capita. Simulation results suggest that
the participation of Portugal in the Euro area im-
proves long-term GDP per capita by between 2.9 per
cent and 13.6 per cent. The most likely scenario
places the gains at just under 10.0 per cent. This
corresponds to an increase in the annual GDP
growth rate of approximately 0.4 percentage points,
say from a long-term trend of 3.1 per cent to 3.5 per
cent.
An important question is the budgetary impact
of the Euro. On one hand, the Stability and
Growth Pact places important constraints on the
domestic public budget. On the other hand, the
reduction of interest rates associated with the par-
ticipation in the Euro area tends to reduce such
pressures. Simulation results suggest that the re-
duction in interest rate and greater GDP growth
associated with the Euro, indeed, greatly reduce
the budgetary pressures imposed by the EMU
rules. As a corollary, simulation results suggest
that the long-term gains associated with lower in-
terest rates may be further enhanced by changes in
the design of the underlying budgetary exercise.
Allowing for the growth of public investment in
the context of the Stability and Growth Pact con-
straints would give rise to a 14.8 per cent increase
of GDP per head in the long-run.
Finally, simulation results suggest that in the
most likely scenario, the long-term effects of the
Euro, i.e. an improvement in long term GDP per
capita of about 10 per cent, are substantially larger
than the effects of structural transfers for the pe-
riod 1996-2006, i.e. a long-term improvement of 3.4
per cent. In fact, the effects of structural transfers
are only marginally greater than the lower bound
of the effects of the Euro. This means that it is rea-
sonable to assume that the effects of the Portu-
guese participation in the Euro area are larger than
the combined effects of the Community Support
Framework programs for the period 1986-2006.
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